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TESTIMONY OF
MANUEL F. COHEN, CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES,
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING
AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

95TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
JUNE 9, 1977

My name is Manuel F. Cohen.

I am a lawyer and

appear here today as chairman of the Commission on Auditors’

Responsibilities.

With me is Lee J. Seidler, deputy chair

man of the Commission, who will join me in answering your
questions.

Mr. Seidler is a non-practising certified

public accountant.

He is a professor of accounting at

New York University and a business analyst and consultant.

The other members of the Commission are:

Walter S. Holmes,

chairman of the board and chief executive officer of a
large finance-based diversified company, a non-practising

CPA;

William C. Norby, a chartered financial analyst and

senior vice-president of a Chicago-based firm of professional
investment advisors, and a former president of the Financial

Analysts Federation;

LeRoy Layton, formerly managing partner

of an international firm of accountants and auditors, a
former president of the American Institute of Certified

Public Accountants and chairman of the Accounting Principles
Board;

Kenneth W. Stringer, senior technical partner in an

international firm of accountants and auditors;

and John J.

van Benten, the managing partner of a midwestern regional
firm of accountants and auditors.

At the outset, we wish to thank the Subcommittee
for this opportunity to appear today.

I understand a summary
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of our Report of Tentative Conclusions has already been
added to the public record, and that certain members of

the Subcommittee and its staff have received copies of the

Report.

Copies have also been sent to Representative John

E. Moss of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce.

The summary is too brief to provide an adequate

understanding of our recommendations or a basis for com
parison with other recommendations submitted to this Sub

committee, some of which we considered and discussed in
our Report.

Accordingly, we suggest that the entire Report

be included in the record of these hearings.

Nearly 50,000 copies of the Report have been dis
tributed to CPA firm offices and to a large number of in

dividuals and organizations concerned with financial re
porting and the role of the auditor.

At the request of

interested organizations, members of the Commission have

been attending numerous seminars and other meetings.
Report is or will be a topic of discussion

The

at annual and

regional meetings of the Financial Executives Institute,

the American Accounting Association, the American Institute
of CPAs, the National Accounting Association and other
groups.
I should also note that we have arranged a public

meeting in Washington beginning on June 21 to receive oral
presentations with respect to our Report.

We have also
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asked for more detailed comment, criticism or suggestions

in the form of written submissions.

Upon the completion

of the meeting and review of the written submissions and
so much of the record of these hearings as may be available

to us, we will review our tentative conclusions and develop
a Final Report, hopefully by the end of this year.

Before I describe the more significant conclusions
of our Report, a few words concerning the background of the
study and our methodology may be useful.

Background of the Commission's Study

The Commission was created as an independent body
by the American Institute of CPAs in the fall of 1974 in
response to growing criticism of the accounting profession.
The Commission was asked to study the role and responsibili

ties of independent auditors and to make recommendations
designed to narrow an apparent gap between the needs and

expectations of users of financial statements and the per
formance of auditors.

A study of such broad scope had

never been undertaken.

All members of the Commission serve without re

muneration.

The financial arrangements whereby our direct

expenses are reimbursed by the AICPA are disclosed in our
Report.

We have had no directions or restrictions as to

the scope of our study or recommendations.
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We viewed the scope of our study broadly.

Orig

inally, we intended to deal with the full range of problems

surrounding auditing.

We decided later that some limita

tions were necessary to enable us to concentrate on audits

of publicly owned corporations since the public interest is

most widely affected by this activity.

We believe we have

addressed the principal issues that relate to the concerns
of our society over the state of the auditing profession.

We found it necessary to undertake a great deal

of research first to identify correctly the major issues
within the framework of our charge and then to determine

the courses of action necessary to gather the data and

Other evidence relevant to an understanding of perceived
problems and recommendations to deal with them.

Subject

to modifications appropriate in the light of comment on

our Tentative Conclusions, we believe our recommendations
when implemented will deal effectively with these problems.
We also believe that additional costs which may result

from the adoption of our recommendations will not be ex

cessive when compared with the benefits.
Our research was extensive and diverse.

We

reviewed previously published materials and sponsored

numerous research projects, surveys, and case studies.
We sought information from many knowledgeable individuals
including accountants in other countries, the chief ac
countants of many government agencies and the staffs of
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the SEC and the General Accounting Office, through dis

cussions, interviews and participation in seminars.

We

also sought and obtained the views of users and preparers
of financial information — security analysts, investment
advisors, officials of banks and other financial institu
tions, professional and amateur investors, academicians
and officers of industrial and commercial enterprises.

We

reviewed the vast amount of material available to us and
drew on the diverse experience of the members of the Com
mission to arrive at what we believe are the most appro

priate conclusions.
Implementation of Recommendations

Implementation of some of our recommendations

will require action by the AICPA, the FASB, the SEC and

other agencies and institutions.

Many are directed at

individual auditors, boards of directors, management,
other elements of the corporate community and can be adopted

without formal or institutional regulation.

For example,

our recommendation that audit committees take an active

role in the process by which the independent auditor is

selected, the scope of his engagement developed, his fee

determined and his work monitored can be adopted quickly

be any board.

We urge individual auditors and their

clients to implement our recommendations without delay.
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Several of our recommendations — perhaps our
most fundamental recommendations — do not lend themselves

to immediate implementation.

These call for a change in

traditional thinking by auditors, corporate directors and

management and the development of improved standards.
Where possible, we have recommended specific actions to

facilitate implementation.
The Expectation-Performance Gap

At the outset, I should note briefly our overall
conclusions.

We concluded that a gap between expectations

and performance does in fact exist; that, to a large extent
public expectations are not unreasonable; that many of them

are within current or potential capabilities of auditors;

that others are clearly beyond the capabilities of auditors

and are based upon misconceptions as to the role, respon
sibility and capability of auditors; but that certain steps
could be taken by the corporate community to meet those

expectations more fully.

Thus, expectations that the

auditor’s report is in the nature of a guarantee of the

complete accuracy of the financial statements, or of the
continued operational and financial success of the issuer
of the financial statements, are based upon misconceptions

Of the nature and limitations of the audit process and the

message intended to be conveyed by the auditor’s report.
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So also, expectations that all major contingencies facing

the issuer will be properly exposed — particularly those
involving necessary judgments by persons trained in law

and acting as legal advisors to the issuer — cannot be

fully satisfied by the auditor.

I should note, however,

that in our Report we deal with these matters and have

included recommendations for meeting these expectations.
Forming an Opinion on Financial Statements

Perhaps our most basic conclusions are contained

in chapter 2 of the Report in which we discuss the process

by which the auditor forms an opinion on financial state
ments.

Auditors have been charged with losing sight, on

occasion, of the fundamental purpose of the audit and the
needs of the users of financial statements.

It has also

been suggested that, at times, auditors have mechanically

followed their procedures and standards and failed to step
back to view their work in perspective and to test whether

the financial statements reflect underlying realities.
We found that auditors sometimes construed too
narrowly generally accepted accounting principles and

failed to exercise the judgments required by GAAP in
reaching a determination whether the accounting principles

selected by the client are appropriate to and consistent
with the underlying facts and not the result of a search
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for the most favorable presentation.

We believe that, in

all but a limited number of situations, the auditor is able

to determine which of the alternative principles seemingly
relevant is preferable in the circumstances.
Finally, auditors have neglected, on occasion,

to evaluate the cumulative effect on the financial state
ments of the selection and application of accounting prin
ciples to discrete underlying transactions.

The selection

and application of selected accounting principles to separate
activities of a company may be within the bounds of account
ing standards in isolation.

The mechanical aggregation of

these separate decisions may, however, produce misleading

results.

The professional auditor can avoid such a result

by proper exercise of care and judgment.
We recommend that auditors be required to deter

mine that the accounting principles selected are the most
appropriate among alternatives except in those very few

situations when there is no basis to make such a determina
tion.

We also recommend that auditors be specifically and

expressly required to evaluate the cumulative effect of

accounting principles choices on the financial statements.

Internal Control

Fundamental to a number of our recommendations
is the function of the internal control system in the cor
porate financial reporting system.

The maintenance of a
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strong system of internal control is the most effective

means of assuring reliable financial information and of
limiting fraud and illegal payments or other actions in
consistent with corporate policy.

But auditors are not

required to comment on the adequacy or quality of the

client’s internal controls or to insist that the client

comment in an appropriate note to the financial statements
or otherwise.
We believe that a major emphasis of the audit

should be on an expanded review of the company’s internal
/
control system so that the auditor can conclude with rea
sonable assurance that the system is free of material

weaknesses.

Coupled with an obligation on the issuer to

comment on the system, such an auditing requirement would
serve as an effective incentive to management to take
prompt steps to eliminate weaknesses.

Reports by Management and the Auditor

We believe that we have developed a more useful
approach than the form of report currently in use for com

municating information concerning the financial reporting
system and the nature and meaning of the audit.

The Com

mission proposes that annual financial statements include
a report on those financial statements and the underlying

system of internal controls from management as well as a
report from the auditor.

The management report would
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indicate management’s primary responsibility for the prepara

tion of the financial statements and would include information
with respect to major contingencies, the adequacy of the
system of internal control and other matters such as cor

porate policies intended to preclude or to minimize oppor
tunities for the commission of illegal acts.

The proposed auditor’s report would be an infor

mative description of the nature and limitations of the
audit work performed and, to the extent appropriate, would
comment on the adequacy of the management report on the

financial statements and related matters such as the nature
and adequacy of the internal control system, rather than,

as now, a bare opinion which, we have found, is not under
stood by many and not read by others.

Our suggested form

of report would allow for variations in content to fit
different circumstances.
The provision of these two reports, which we

believe should be written in language understandable to

readers, would lead to an improved understanding by all
users of financial reports of the nature of the reporting
and the auditing process and of the responsibilities of
management and of the auditor.

New Framework of the Audit Function
Our recommendation that the audit be viewed as
a review of the overall financial reporting system would
allow further innovation.

We concluded that the present
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focus of an audit on a specific set of financial statements
issued once a year is too narrow and obsolete.

The process

of reporting financial information by companies is continuous
throughout the year.

Rather than the traditional once-a-

year audit of financial statements, the audit should be

considered as involving an examination of the entire report

ing system to be performed over time.

Development of the

proposed new framework would result in a more reliable

reporting system and provide a vehicle for orderly evolution

and expansion of the audit function.

And a more reliable

reporting system would produce interim financial statements

on which the auditor would be able to provide a higher degree
of assurance than he can now provide.
Management Fraud and Illegal Acts

A major portion of the Commission’s study was
directed at the auditor’s responsibilities for the detec

tion and disclosure of management fraud and illegal acts.
Auditors have been reluctant to acknowledge an affirmative

responsibility to search for fraud and illegal acts out of
fear that failure to detect such matters would be equated

with substandard performance.
Of course, an audit cannot guarantee that all

frauds and illegal acts will be detected.

The Commission

has concluded, however, that the audit should be appro
priately designed, and an affirmative obligation of the
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auditor to search out material fraud based upon a standard
of "due professional care" be clearly spelled out, as a
basis for providing greater assurance that financial

statements are not affected by material fraud.
We reached a similar conclusion with respect to

illegal or questionable acts.

We recommended a three-step

program by which the auditor would more usefully be involved

in the detection and exposure of such acts.

The program

would consist of:
1.

The development and wide publication

by the board of directors of the client company

of a policy statement that specified unacceptable

behavior in reasonable detail.
2.

The development and implementation,

in consultation with the auditor, of a system
of controls and procedures to monitor com
pliance with the policy statement, and

3.

Review of the control system by the

auditor to test its continuing effectiveness.

One of the major issues in the controversy over
the auditor’s responsibility for illegal or questionable
acts by management is the relationship to the concept of

materiality.

Conventional concepts of materiality, based

principally on quantitative considerations, are inappli
cable to known illegal or questionable acts.

The auditor
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should not take it upon himself to determine that some
violations of law or propriety are more or less serious

than others.

The auditor must give the act appropriate

attention regardless of the amounts involved.

By ’’appro

priate attention”, we mean pursuing the matter until sat

isfactory disposition is obtained.

Lacking satisfactory

disposition in such cases, which might include adequate

disclosure in the management letter accompanying the
financial statements or otherwise, the auditor would be
required to comment, particularly where they violate

published corporate policies.
While the Statements of Auditing Standards on

fraud and illegal acts recently issued by the AICPA —
prior to the publication of our Report — do not go as

far as we would like, we are pleased to note that they

include a number of suggestions contained in our Report.

MAS and Independence
An issue of particular concern to the Subcom
mittee, also addressed in our Report, relates to manage

ment advisory services provided by auditors.

Certain

management advisory services are a potential threat to
auditor independence.

We examined the literature and

other materials bearing on the matter, including the
views of leading critics of such activities by independent
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auditors.

However, we did not find any cases in which

management services in fact led to audit failure and

could not objectively conclude that a blanket prohibition
of all MAS is warranted.

We do, however, recommend that boards of direc
tors and audit committees become more actively involved

in the process of selection and performance of management

advisory services.

We also recommend that executive

placement services that involve a clear conflict of interest
for the auditor be prohibited.

Our most important recommen

dation in regard to MAS is that all services provided to the

client by the auditor be disclosed in management’s proxy
statement.

Such disclosures would provide much needed

information as to the extent and nature of services pro
vided and a basis for evaluating conflicts or the appear
ance of conflicts.

Time Pressures and Substandard Performance
A large part of our research was directed at

determining the causes of substandard audit performance.
Apart from our analysis of specific past audit failures,

we sponsored an extensive survey of the views of auditors
at every level as to inadequacies in the performance of
audit personnel.

The survey developed information which

indicated that time and budget pressures, prompted by a

variety of factors within a firm, appear to be the prin
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cipal causes of substandard performance.

In part, these

pressures stemmed from arbitrary and unrealistic dead

lines imposed by clients.

Competitive pressures were

also cited.

We recommend that firms examine their budgeting
and scheduling policies to make sure they do not lead to
the type of unnecessary pressures on personnel that have
resulted in substandard audits.

A review of time budget

ing procedures should be included in every quality control

program.

Again, I want to thank the Subcommittee for
inviting us to participate in these hearings.

I believe

they will result in much useful action by the profession

that might not otherwise have been undertaken.

Now Pro

fessor Seidler and I, indeed all of my colleagues, would

be happy to answer any questions you may have on the

points I just reviewed or on any of the other recommen
dations or conclusions in our Report.

